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Abstract
With a view to investigating the presence of adverse selection, we analyze determinants
of private pension insurance uptake of German households in a probit model. Using
survey data on savings and old-age provision, we ﬁnd that subjective life expectancy
is positively related with the probability of having supplementary private pension in-
surance. This indicates that the German annuities market is in fact characterized by
adverse selection. Furthermore, pre-existing annuities from the public pension sys-
tem tend to be a substitute to private insurance, while ﬁnancial literacy enhances the
uptake. We also ﬁnd evidence for a bequest motive in old-age provision, but see no
indication for pooling longevity risk within couples.
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1 Introduction
The German welfare state comprises a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system
designed to prevent old-age poverty and to maintain standard of living after withdrawal
from working life. In contrast to funded systems, a PAYG plan is directly ﬁnanced from
current contributions and therefore requires a nearly permanent balance of contribu-
tions and payments. Population aging and negative incentive eﬀects have increasingly
threatened the German system and triggered a reform process to keep its ﬁnancing
sustainable. This has been accompanied by a lively discussion of the opportunities and
limitations of the system, that has created awareness of falling replacement rates from
the public statutory system and the need for supplementary private old-age provision.
In addition to pure accumulation of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets, investment in
private pension insurance policies presents one possible way to raise retirement income
and concomitantly insures against outliving one’s wealth. Consequences of shifting
substantial parts of old-age provision from the public to the private sector, however,
depend on eﬃciency of this market.
A main concern over insurance markets raised by theoretical research, is the pres-
ence of information asymmetries between insurers and the insured that lead to market
failure due to moral hazard and adverse selection. Pension insurance insures the ﬁ-
nancial risk related to longevity. Moral hazard would be present if pension insurance
coverage induced life-prolonging behavior that cannot be observed by the insurer. Ad-
verse selection would be present if length of life could be more accurately predicted
by the insurant himself than by the insurer, and people expecting relatively long life
systematically purchased larger pension insurance coverage. Concerning moral hazard,
most people agree that in developed countries like Germany individual life-prolonging
activities can be seen as independent of pension insurance coverage. Moral hazard is
therefore reasonably assumed to be quantitatively negligible, if not non-existent1. In
contrast, adverse selection in pension insurance markets is a concern. As a consequence
of adverse selection, premiums rise and eventually become prohibitively high for low
risk individuals who are pushed out of the market.
In an attempt to explain the observed low uptake of annuities -the annuity puzzle-
related studies consistently provide evidence for adverse selection in the UK and the
US annuities market (Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) for the UK and Fried-
man and Warshawsky (1990), Mitchell et al. (1999), Brown (2001) and Brown
et al. (2008a) for the US). First empirical evidence by von Gaudecker and We-
ber (2004) suggests that the German private pension market is also characterized
by adverse selection. If this was the case, it might be too expensive for individuals
who expect to die to early to compensate public pension shortfalls by private pension
1This view is shared in large parts of the literature; see among others Finkelstein and Poterba
(2004) and Rothschild (2009). See, however, Philipson and Becker (1998) for a discussion of the
existence of moral hazard eﬀects in the market for annuities.1 INTRODUCTION 5
insurance.
Our work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuity markets. In
contrast to most related studies that take the Money’s Worth approach introduced by
Friedman and Warshawsky (1988), we investigate the existence of adverse selec-
tion on the micro level. Our main interest is the explanatory power of subjective life
expectancy in the uptake of private pension insurance. According to previous research,
subjective life expectancy is a remarkably good predictor of actual lifetime. In par-
ticular, it is superior to predictions based on mortality tables as made by the insurers
(Hamermesh (1985), Hurd and McGarry (1995), Hurd and McGarry (2002)).
Expectations about lifetime therefore represent private information and give a risk se-
lection opportunity to the insurants as return on investment of a pension insurance
policy increases with lifetime. Based on this ﬁnding, our work now seeks to answer
the question of whether people actually make use of their private information about
lifetime when deciding about old-age provision. If, conditional on other relevant de-
terminants, subjective life expectancy was positively associated with the probability of
having supplementary private pension insurance, this would indicate adverse selection
in this market.
We will test this hypothesis using the German SAVE survey data on savings and old-
age provision. Guided by the theory of savings and the life cycle with uncertain time of
death beginning with Yaari (1965) and previous empirical studies, we provide an in-
depth analysis of the determinants of pension insurance uptake of German households
with a special focus on the role of subjective life expectancy. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the related theoretical
and empirical literature. The German Old-Age Pension System is shortly presented in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and methodology in use and contains estimation
results. Section 5 ﬁnally concludes.2 RELATED LITERATURE 6
2 Related Literature
Within an overall assessment of the determinants of pension insurance uptake, we
speciﬁcally focus on the role of subjective life expectancy to understand whether the
German private pension market is characterized by adverse selection. Our work thus
mainly relates to two broad strands in the literature. First, we refer to the theoretical
and empirical literature on life cycle savings and annuity demand dealing with optimal
annuitization in portfolio choice and practically relevant determinants of the annuiti-
zation decision. Second, we refer to the theoretical and empirical discussion of adverse
selection in insurance markets in general and in annuity markets in particular.
Yaari (1965) was the ﬁrst who incorporated uncertain lifetimes in the classical life
cycle savings theory of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). His model is a theoret-
ical conjunction of mortality expectations and time and risk preference parameters in
determining optimal annuitization. The main implication of his theory of consumption
under the presence of longevity risk is that risk averse utility maximizing consumers
who face actuarially fair insurance prices should fully annuitize their wealth, provided
that they do not have any bequest motive. Davidoff et al. (2005) later conﬁrmed
the complete annuitization result within a more general framework.
Compared to the theoretical predictions of full or at least high annuitization, ob-
served uptake of annuities is surprisingly low (Friedman and Warshawsky (1990),
Brown and Poterba (2000), James and Song (2001) and James and Vittas
(2004)). This gap between theory and reality has caused a large body of literature
dedicated to resolve this so called annuity puzzle. Among potential explanations for
the puzzle are adverse selection, administrative load factors, bequest motives, risk-
sharing within families, pre-existing annuities from social security, ﬁnancial illiteracy
and precautionary savings for the event of unexpected expenditure shocks. In this con-
text, Brown (2001) empirically investigates the behavioral relevance of Yaari’s life
cycle model by relating a utility measure of annuity value to actual household decisions.
Following the life cycle model, he calculates the utility measure - the annuity equiva-
lent wealth - based on cohort mortality tables and survey data on risk aversion, marital
status, and the presence of pre-existing annuity ﬂows from social security. Brown
(2001) ﬁnds that households that are predicted by the life cycle model to have a higher
valuation of annuities are in fact more likely to annuitize their retirement resources.
However, in accordance with the annuity puzzle, much of the variation in the actual
decision remains unexplained by the life cycle model. He therefore considers several
additional factors that might inﬂuence the annuitization decision where he identiﬁes
individual health status and time horizon to be the most relevant.
Related to our research purpose, the importance of individual health status in ex-
plaining the actual annuitization decision conditional on average mortality from life
tables is particularly interesting. It points to the fact that people use private informa-2 RELATED LITERATURE 7
tion on health status and expected longevity in the old-age provision decision which
would be consistent with the presence of adverse selection in annuity markets. A gen-
eral theoretical framework of adverse selection was introduced by Akerlof (1970)
which Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) later applied to the insurance market. The
basic idea is that private information about individual risk gives insurants an informa-
tion advantage over the insurer which allows higher-risk individuals to self-select into
insurance contracts. Pooled risks are then comparatively high, insurance premiums
rise and crowd lower-risk individuals out of the market. Thus, the theory of adverse
selection predicts a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk.
A wide body of literature studies the empirical importance of adverse selection
in insurance markets. Two markets that have been frequently under study are the
automobile and the health insurance market. For the automobile insurance market,
the early studies of Dahlby (1983) and Puelz and Snow (1994) suggest a positive
coverage-risk correlation, which, however, was not reinforced by subsequent research
(Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001)). Conﬂicting ﬁndings
are also available for the health insurance market. While Cutler and Zeckhauser
(1998) support the theoretical prediction of positive correlation, Cardon and Hendel
(2001) and Fang et al. (2008) reject it. Available studies on the market for life insur-
ance (Cawley and Philipson (1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming))
so far consistently suggest absence of adverse selection2.
Concerning annuity markets, the empirical literature rather uniformly concludes
that these are characterized by adverse selection. From a methodological point of view,
two diﬀerent strands of empirical investigations of adverse selection in the market for
annuities can be distinguished. Roughly, the ﬁrst strand compares mortality data of an-
nuitants and non-annuitants or the general population. This strand includes the large
number of studies that apply the concept of money’s worth to identify how much of an
insurance premium’s deviation from the actuarily fair premium can be attributed to
selection eﬀects. Friedman and Warshawsky (1988) introduced the money’s worth
approach which was later reﬁned by Mitchell et al. (1999). By now, the money’s
worth is commonly understood as the expected net present value of payouts in relation
to premium costs which is separately calculated using population and insurance mor-
tality tables. Several studies applied this concept to investigate the extent of adverse
selection in annuity markets in various countries. Most frequently studied are the mar-
kets in the US (Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell et al. (1999))
and in the UK (Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004)). Further examinations have
been done for Germany (von Gaudecker and Weber (2004)), Australia (Doyle
et al. (2004)) and Singapore (Doyle et al. (2004) and Fong (2002)), as well as for
Canada, Chile, Israel and Switzerland (James and Song (2001)). McCarthy and
2See Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a recent review of the empirical literature on adverse
selection in insurance markets.2 RELATED LITERATURE 8
Mitchell (forthcoming) and Rothschild (2009) also compare mortality tables of
policyholders with those of the general population, but do not explicitly calculate the
money’s worth. All these studies ﬁnd evidence for adverse selection which, however,
can only partially explain the annuity puzzle due to its limited extent.
The more recent second strand, where our study belongs to, analyzes adverse selec-
tion from the perspective of the policyholder using micro level data. While the focus
of the ﬁrst strand lies on a quantitative estimation of the eﬀects of adverse selection on
insurance premiums, the second strand is able to simultaneously assess the relevance
of subjective life expectancy and other determinants of annuity uptake. In addition,
the money’s worth does not allow to distinguish between active mortality selection
based on asymmetric information about health and expected longevity and passive
mortality selection reﬂecting other diﬀerences such as wealth and income that are also
correlated with mortality (Finkelstein and Poterba (2002)). Due to data limita-
tions, research taking the micro approach is less frequently done. Most closely related
to our analysis, is the study by Brown et al. (2008a) who use data from the US
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They investigate self-reported willingness of the
elderly population to exchange part of their social security inﬂation-indexed annuity
beneﬁt for an immediate lump-sum payment by self-reported health status and sub-
jective survival probabilities. Their results are consistent with predictions of standard
theoretical models of adverse selection, since individuals with poor health-status and
pessimistic life expectations are less likely to annuitize, but tend to prefer lump-sum
payments. Another related study by Inkmann et al. (2009) uses the English Lon-
gitudinal Study of Aging and investigates actual annuity uptake in the UK. In line
with Brown et al. (2008a), they ﬁnd that subjective life expectancy of annuitants
is signiﬁcantly higher than that of their non-policyholding counterparts which points
to the presence of adverse selection in the UK annuity market as well.
Our work diﬀers from the existing studies, not only by country and underlying data:
In contrast to Brown et al. (2008a) who consider stated intentions to annuitize re-
tirement income, we are able to observe actual demand for private pension insurance of
households. Compared to Inkmann et al. (2009), we dispose of a more comprehen-
sive set of variables, as we are able to build proxies for preference parameters reﬂecting
risk aversion and time preference that are not included in their data.3 THE GERMAN OLD-AGE PENSION SYSTEM 9
3 The German Old-Age Pension System
For our further analysis, it is instructive to brieﬂy consider the German old-age pension
system which consists of three coexisting pillars. Three things should be noted from
the following description. First, the public ﬁrst pillar is still by far the most important
source of old-age income. Second, beneﬁt levels from the ﬁrst pillar diﬀer for diﬀerent
population groups mainly depending on their type of employment. Third, the private
pension insurance considered in our work is part of the third pillar and allows anyone
to supplement pre-existing beneﬁts.
Introduced by Otto von Bismarck in 1889 as a fully funded system, the German
public old-age pension system was gradually converted into a PAYG system from 1957
on. Outstanding generosity was as key characteristic of the German system after
the 1972 reform in terms of both replacement rates and ﬂexibility of retirement age.
However, increasing life expectancy in times of low fertility and the resulting population
aging coupled with negative incentive eﬀects began to threaten the system. Starting
with a major reform in 1992, beneﬁt cuts were implemented in an eﬀort to stabilize its
functioning (Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004)). Nowadays, the so-called ﬁrst pillar
of the three-pillar old-age provision system comprises statutory pension insurance for all
employees covered by the German social security system, old-age security for farmers,
professional provision for certain groups of self-employed like physicians, lawyers and
architects as well as the civil-service pension scheme. Except for the self-employed who
are at liberty to participate, the whole work force is subject to mandatory coverage
within the ﬁrst pillar. Although the relative importance of the three pillars has changed
in disfavor of the ﬁrst pillar, it still constitutes the most important source of old-age
income. In 2007, the public pension scheme covered about 92% of the German elderly
and accounted for about 76% of total gross old-age income (ASID 07 (2009)).
The various subsystems within the ﬁrst pillar, like the old-age security for farmers
or the civil-service pension scheme have neither historically been equally generous, nor
have they undergone beneﬁt cuts in an equal measure. In particular, in 2007, persons
of age 65 and older whose last position was denoted as civil-servant, drew an average
monthly gross pension of 2670e from the public system. This amounted to an average
of 1195e for former blue- and white-collar worker and to only 813e for former farmers
and self-employed who were least secured by the public scheme (ASID 07 (2009)).
Employees in the private and the public sector are free to supplement their beneﬁts
from the mandatory statutory pension insurance by an occupational pension scheme
within the second pillar. This is typically organized in form of deferred compensa-
tions, where employees waive part of their salary in favor of employer-provided retire-
ment beneﬁts. In 2007, beneﬁts from occupational pension plans represented about 8%
of total old-age income and accrued to 27% of the retirees (ASID 07 (2009)). Private
old-age provision as the third pillar involves additional accumulation of assets like3 THE GERMAN OLD-AGE PENSION SYSTEM 10
investment funds, shares, real-estate, private pension insurance and life insurance that
can be depleted during retirement. From 2002 and 2005 on, the third pillar has also
included the state-subsidized Riester- and Rürup pension plans. Overall, the third
pillar accounted for 10% of total old-age incomes in 2007 (ASID 07 (2009)).
Anybody is at liberty to purchase a private pension policy to raise retirement
income. While beneﬁts are usually paid out as a monthly pension, most insurance
companies oﬀer the option of a single lump-sum payment, instead. In both cases, a
minimum beneﬁt is guaranteed, while any proﬁt bonus is uncertain and depends on
the development of the capital market. Insurance companies oﬀer various supplemen-
tal agreements for the standard policy, mostly related to dependants’ protection. In a
standard contract, pension are paid until the policyholder dies. In order to avoid highly
negative returns of investment, guarantee periods, survivor’s pensions or contribution
refund in case of early death can be agreed upon with the insurer. These additional
agreements all come at some cost in the sense of lower pensions for a given monthly
contribution. Finally, it should be noted that redemption of a purchased policy is
ﬁnancially highly disadvantageous, since contributions for the ﬁrst years are used to
cover broker remuneration and administrative expenses.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 11
4 Empirical Analysis of Insurance Determinants
We now investigate the determinants of private pension insurance demand of German
households in a probit model. Section 4.1 describes the data and the derived variables.
The methodology is explained in Section 4.2 that also contains estimation results.
4.1 Data and Derived Variables
The cross-sectional data in use is the 2005 wave of the German SAVE study consisting
of 2305 households. SAVE is a nationally representative survey of German households
held by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). With the
main focus on savings behavior, ﬁnancial assets and old-age provision, the survey also
includes data on demographic, economic and psychologic characteristics of households.
A ﬁrst experimental wave was launched in 2001. From 2005 on, SAVE is an annually
conducted panel of more than 2000 households3.
We choose the level of the analysis to be the household because we view old-age
provision as a household and not an individual task. Furthermore, the data only
contains information on insurance contracts of households and does not allow to dis-
tinguish between diﬀerent policyholders within households. Our attention is restricted
to non-retired households where neither the head nor the spouse has retired because
old-age provision occurs before retirement. The dependent variable PPI in our probit
regression is a binary variable indicating whether a household holds a private pension
insurance policy in 20054. Independent variables are grouped into i) the theoretically
motivated explanatory variables life expectancy, risk and time preferences, ii) control
variables for substitutive old-age provision and ﬁnancial literacy and iii) control vari-
ables for other household socioeconomic characteristics.
i) Life expectancy, risk aversion and time preference
Average subjective life expectancy per household is calculated in three steps. First,
respondents are asked to estimate average life expectancy of men and women of their
age group (AV LEmale and AV LEfemale). Second, they indicate the number of years
they expect themselves to deviate from the average life expectancy of people of their
3Details on the the design of the SAVE study can be found in Schunk (2007) and Börsch-Supan
et al. (2008a). Item nonresponse in SAVE is adressed by an iterative multiple imputation procedure
using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Provided a properly performed imputation, regression
based on multiply imputed data leads to eﬃciency gains and avoids potential biases from systematic
nonresponse. We will therefore take advantage of the ﬁve imputed data sets for SAVE 2005 provided
by MEA. For further information on the imputation procedure used in SAVE see Börsch-Supan
et al. (2008a), Schunk (2008) and Ziegelmeyer (2009).
4The precise wording in the survey is “Other contractually agreed private pension scheme, e.g.
investment funds geared speciﬁcally to the provision of pension cover, private pension insurance policies
which are not promoted by the state or which were taken out before such support was available.”4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 12
sex and age (EXPY EARSDEVhead). Also, they indicate the number of years they
expect their partner to deviate from the average life expectancy of his/her sex and
age (EXPY EARSDEVspouse). Subjective life expectancy for the household head is
implicitly given by this information and can be calculated as SLEhead = AV LE(fe)male+
EXPY EARSDEVhead. Calculation of subjective life expectancy for the spouse relies
on two (weak) assumptions: ﬁrst, sex of the spouse is assumed to be opposite to the one
of the head, and, second, age of the spouse is assumed to be about the same as the one of
the head5 6. It is then given by SLEspouse = AV LE(fe)male +EXPY EARSDEVspouse.
Risk attitudes and time preferences of the household head are indirectly inferred
from hypothetical choices inquired in the survey. Table 1 displays the two sets of
options that are used for their derivation. In the ﬁrst set, people are requested to
choose between options A and B in three diﬀerent hypothetical lotteries. A is always
a certain zero, while B implies a 50% chance of loosing 100e and a 50% chance of
winning 200e, 300e and 400e, respectively. RISKAV is a dummy variable that is
equal to one for the most risk averse individuals who always opt for A, even in the
third lottery where potential payment in B is highest.
First Set 1 2 3
A 100% 0 0 0
B 50% -100 -100 -100
50% 200 300 400
Second Set 1 2 3
A now -800 -800 -800
B in 10 months -825 -870 -990
Table 1: Hypothetical choices to elicit risk and time preferences
In the second set, the hypothetical choice is not between certain and uncertain
payments, but between payments at diﬀerent points in time. In each scenario, A is an
immediate payment of 800e, while B is a payment of 825e, 870e and 990e in 10
months. TIMEPREF is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the most impatient
individuals that always opt for paying in 10 months even if the postponed payment
is highest7. We are only able to infer preferences of the household head, but not of
5We view even the latter assumption as non-critical, since, on average, the household head is only
0.17 years older than his or her spouse in the 864 partner households with a standard deviation of
5.31 years.
6In a similar manner, Brown (2001), Brown et al. (2008a) and Inkmann et al. (2009) refer
to individual expected survival probabilities. Data limitations force most other studies to make either
use of aggregate mortality tables or the less nuanced self-assessed health status as a proxy.
7Comparable measures for risk aversion based on hypothetical lottery choices inquired in surveys
are used by Salm (2006) and Brown et al. (2008a). Cutler et al. (2008) furthermore suggests
indicators like drinking and smoking behaviour, job-based mortality risk, preventive care and the
use of seat belts that are also frequently used. An analogous measure of time preference is derived
by Brown et al. (2008a) from an experimental module in the 2004 HRS. Other studies rely on4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 13
the spouse which, however, is less a concern since the head states to be involved in
ﬁnancial decision-making in 95% of all cases.
ii) Financial literacy and substitutive old-age provision
Since old-age provision is a complex matter that requires a certain degree of knowl-
edge in ﬁnancial aﬀairs, we account for the ﬁnancial literacy of households by their
stock market participation. More precisely, FINLIT is a dummy variable indicating
whether the household holds equity and real-estate funds or other ﬁnancial assets like
equity bonds, discount certiﬁcates, hedge funds, wind power funds, ﬁlm funds and
other ﬁnancial innovations. Stock market participation is an appropriate proxy for
ﬁnancial literacy as investment in this type of assets reveals a certain level of ﬁnancial
sophistication (van Rooij et al. (2007))8.
As private pension insurance is only one component of overall old-age provision,
we need to take into account expected beneﬁts from the ﬁrst and second pillar as
well as other types of third pillar old-age provision like real estate property, Riester
pension plans, equity funds etc. We use type of employment of the main earner
in order to approximate the expected beneﬁt level from the ﬁrst pillar of the old-
age provision system due to the previously noted substantially varying beneﬁt levels
by type of employment. Employment is classiﬁed in four categories: civil servant
(CIV SERV ), white/blue-collar worker (WORKER), self-employed (SELFEMPL)
and unemployed (UNEMPL).
Part of the population is eligible to occupational pension schemes and the government-
subsidized Riester pension plans. We control for beneﬁts from these sources by a vari-
able containing the end of December 2004 balances of occupational pension schemes
and Riester contracts (OTHINS). We also control for total private wealth that can be
used to maintain consumption levels during retirement. NETWEALTH is the sum of
all assets excluding pension insurance. It consists of ﬁnancial assets, business property,
real property and other assets net of total debt. In some estimation speciﬁcations, the
latter two types of substitutive old-age provision are adjusted by equivalence scales to
account for diﬀering ﬁnancial needs of single and partner households (OTHINSEQ,
NETWEALTHEQ). We divide insurance balances and net wealth by 1.5 for partner
households following the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale that assigns a weight of 0.5
to the second adult in a household.
the length of the ﬁnancial planning horizon to proxy for time preferences (Salm (2006) and Brown
et al. (2008a)).
8The related empirical literature uses various other measures to capture ﬁnancial literacy. Brown
(2001) and Inkmann et al. (2009) rely on the general education level, while Mottola and Utkus
(2007) gather from demographic characteristics to ﬁnancial experience. Yet others use contact with
tax advisors (Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b)) or create indices by dint of direct investigations in
surveys (Agnew et al. (2008), Brown et al. (2008a) and Bucher-Koenen (2009)).4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 14
iii) Socioeconomic characteristics
Finally, we control for households’ socioeconomic characteristics that we assess to be
relevant for the insurance choice. Average age, AV AGE, is supposed to represent the
maturity status of the household in its life cycle. AV AGESQ, the squared average age,
is included to allow for a possible nonlinear eﬀect of age. PARTNER is a dummy vari-
able designed to distinguish partner and single households. Alternatively, we include
MARRIED that identiﬁes married respondents. NRCHILD equals the number of
children and stepchildren of the head and his spouse9. EAST is a dummy variable
that characterizes households located in Eastern Germany. NETINC(EQ) is the net
(equivalent) income of the household that should control for its purchasing power10.
The original sample size reduces to an estimation sample of 1320 households due
to the following exclusion rules: First, only non-retired households where neither the
head nor the spouse has retired are considered (836 observations). Second, we drop
households with inconsistent estimates of individual life expectancy, where the indi-
cated average life expectancy of people of their age and sex is less than current age (5
observations). Third, all households with a missing value for the dependent variable
PPI are excluded (144 observations). The reason is that missing values were imputed
using variables that will be partially included on the right hand side of the regression
equation which would otherwise yield a self-made correlation. Means of the variables
and their cross-correlations for the estimation sample are given in Tables 2 and 311.
9The presence of children is accounted for to capture a possible bequest motive in old-age provision
(Hurd (1987), Bernheim (1991), Johnson et al. (2004), Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) and
Inkmann et al. (2009)). Yet other authors rely on self-reported importance of bequest motives
(Brown (2001)) or the existence of a will or trust (Brown et al. (2008a)).
10In contrast to the substitutive old-age provision where we only adjust for a partner, we also
account for children when calculating net equivalent income. The reason is that the ability to pay
insurance premiums from current income depends on the presence of children, whereas retirement
income typically only serves the ﬁnancial needs of the parents. Calculation of net equivalent income
of a household conceptually again follows the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale. Some speciﬁcations
contain the net equivalent income, others the unadjusted net income. We also considered an alternative
income measure roughly adjusted for subsistence income as deﬁned by the Hartz IV regulations which,
however, left our results unaﬀected.
11Generally note the following: We observe holdings of private pension insurance and household
characteristics in 2005 or end December 2004. Theory suggests that starting from a situation without
an insurance policy, a household implicitly calculates his net beneﬁt from buying insurance in any
given period. If this beneﬁt is positive, the household buys a private pension insurance policy. In
consecutive periods, the problem changes into the one of keeping or selling the previously bought
policy. Selling a policy implies a ﬁnancial loss due to administrative expenses. A critical point in our
analysis is that we are unable to distinguish between new and old policyholders. Hence, there might
be households in our sample that keep a policy though they would not buy it if they could newly
decide in 2005. It would therefore be meaningful to run a similar analysis on the uptake of private
pension insurance policies with panel data which, however, requires a larger sample size and a stable
panel structure.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 15
Estimation Sample PPI=1 PPI=0
N=1320 N=206 (16%) N=1114 (84%)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
AVSLE 78.85 7.45 79.98 7.00 78.64 7.52
RISKAV* 0.63 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.49
TIMEPREF* 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.31
FINLIT* 0.22 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.19 0.39
CIVSERV* 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
WORKER* 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.63 0.48
SELFEMPL* 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.08 0.27
NETWEALTHEQ 126391.04 654089.98 158505.88 378974.84 120452.38 690881.82
NETWEALTH 177730.02 963460.62 228605.02 566677.04 168322.22 1016677.22
OTHINSEQ 2060.69 8313.76 3837.97 11988.97 1732.04 7397.30
OTHINS 2917.71 11651.37 5457.61 16848.50 2448.04 10350.31
AVAGE 41.14 10.86 41.10 8.75 41.14 11.21
AVAGESQ 1810.25 888.30 1765.70 715.02 1818.48 916.80
NRCHILD 1.55 1.31 1.46 1.15 1.56 1.34
PARTNER* 0.65 0.48 0.76 0.43 0.64 0.48
MARRIED* 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.50
NETINCEQ 1447.86 1687.41 1807.97 2443.28 1381.27 1498.79
NETINC 2465.45 2801.94 3100.61 3410.99 2348.00 2659.40
EAST* 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46
Table 2: Sample means of dependent and independent variables by private pension insurance
holdings; averaged over the ﬁve datasets; variables marked with * are dummy variables
4.2 Estimation and Results
To estimate determinants of private pension insurance uptake, we specify a probit
model with the dichotomous dependent variable PPIi for all households i = 1:::N.
PPIi takes the value one for households holding a private pension insurance policy in




1 with probability pi = Pr(PPIi = 1 j Xi)
0 with probability (1   pi) = Pr(PPIi = 0 j Xi)
(1)
It is illustrative to interpret the binary response model as an outcome of an underlying
latent variable model where the latent variable PPI
i can generally be modeled as
PPI

i = Xi + "i: (2)
In the probit framework, the residual error term is assumed to be standard normally
distributed. If the latent dependent variable PPI
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Combining equations (1) and (2) allows to express the individual probability of having
private pension insurance as Pr(PPIi = 1) = F(Xi), where the parametric function
F(:) is assumed to be the (standard) normal cumulative distribution function. As
usual, we estimate the probit model by maximum-likelihood estimation. To deal with
item non-response, we take advantage of the ﬁve multiply imputed data sets provided
by MEA and combine the separate complete-data results by the method known as
Rubin’s Rule (Rubin (1987)).
We distinguish between a reduced model with purely theory-lead explanatory vari-
ables and ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a full model where vectors of previously derived
control variables Xi are included. The underlying latent model is thus speciﬁed as
PPI

i = 1 + 2AV SLEi + 3RISKAVi + 4TIMEPREFi(+Xi) + "i: (4)
Table 4 displays average marginal eﬀects calculated using Rubin’s Rules for multiply
imputed data for a reduced model and ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the full model12.
Summaries of the estimations are given in Table 7 in the Appendix. The p-values of the
likelihood ratio test of the full vs. the intercept-only model in the second rows of each
panel are zero. We therefore conclude that the whole model is statistically signiﬁcant.
Let us ﬁrst consider the reduced model. As illustrated in the ﬁrst column of Table
4, estimation results closely correspond to our expectations. In particular, average
subjective life expectancy signiﬁcantly positively inﬂuences the demand for private
pension insurance. Other things being equal, households who expect to become old,
are more likely to purchase supplementary private pension insurance than those who
expect to die young. Quantitatively, the eﬀect seems to be small, but it is statistically
signiﬁcant at a level of 1.3 percent. Risk averse individuals should be more willing to
insure their longevity risk and thus exhibit a larger likelihood of having private pension
insurance. Correspondingly, the marginal eﬀect of risk aversion on private pension
insurance uptake is positive, but insigniﬁcant. Since investment in pension insurance
postpones today’s consumption to tomorrow, individuals with high time preference
should buy private pension insurance less frequently than their patient counterparts.
12Marginal eﬀects can be either evaluated at ﬁxed values of the independent variables, typcially the
means, or averaged over all observations. The ﬁrst are called marginal eﬀects at the mean (MEM),
while the latter are referred to as average marginal eﬀects (AME). The main argument in favor of AME
is the fact that sample means used during the calculation of MEM might refer to either nonexistent
or nonsensical observations (Bartus (2005)). For comparison, we also calculated the MEM which are
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As expected, a high rate of time preference is associated with a low predicted probability
of having private pension insurance. With a p-value of 0.002, this relationship is highly
signiﬁcant in the reduced model.
Now, let us direct our attention to the full model in columns two to six of Table 4.
Estimation results for the full model prove to be robust across the ﬁve speciﬁcations.
Compared to the reduced model, our previous results qualitatively remain stable. As
before, the probability of having private pension insurance signiﬁcantly increases with
average subjective life expectancy. We therefore conclude that people rationally take
expectations about lifetime into account when deciding about old-age provision. Com-
bined with the predictive power of subjective expectations of lifetime, this indicates
risk-based selection due to private information. Hence, our investigation of the Ger-
man annuity market conﬁrms the commnon ﬁnding that annuity markets are in fact
characterized by adverse selection.
The impact of risk aversion on pension insurance is again estimated to be insigniﬁ-
cantly positive. Thus, preference-driven selection based on risk aversion does not seem
to play a major role in the annuitization decision. This conﬂicts the emerging literature
on propitious or advantageous selection based on risk aversion that emphasizes selec-
tion eﬀects driven by risk attitudes instead of riskiness (Hemenway (1990), De Meza
and Webb (2001)). Besides the admittedly noisy proxy, a potential explanation is
collinearity of risk aversion and subjective life expectancy. This would hold, if risk
aversion increased life expectancy due to more cautious health behavior and if indi-
viduals rationally took this eﬀect into account when building their expectations about
lifetime. Simple cross-correlation analysis as given in Table 3, however, throws doubt
on this explanation because the correlation coeﬃcient is close to zero and even slightly
negative. Instead, we attribute insigniﬁcance of the marginal eﬀect of risk aversion to a
framing eﬀect (Brown et al. (2008b)). People might view private pension insurance
policies as a type of investment rather than insurance. Due to its dependency on the
ex ante unknown lifetime, return on investment in private pension insurance policies
is relatively uncertain. In this regard, risk averse people should less frequently invest
in pension insurance. Our result closely corresponds to Brown et al. (2008a) who
use a similar proxy for risk aversion. In most of their speciﬁcations, more risk averse
people do not exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood of taking annuities instead of a
lump-sum payment. In contrast, Cutler et al. (2008) ﬁnd the expected relation-
ship between risk-related behaviour and annuitization. Smokers or individuals with
risky jobs are less likely to be covered by annuities, whereas individuals that undertake
preventive health activities or those who always wear seatbelts are more likely to be
covered by annuities.
While it is still estimated to be negative, the marginal eﬀect of time preference
on the probability of having private pension insurance becomes insigniﬁcant once the
control variables are taken into consideration. Using an analogous proxy for time4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 20
preference, Brown et al. (2008a) also does not detect a robust relationship between
time preference and annuity uptake. According to his result, patient individuals tend
to be less likely to prefer the annuity over the lump-sum payment which, however, is
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in only two out of ﬁve speciﬁcations. We conclude
that the eﬀect is mainly attributed to other characteristics of the household than their
time preference. A possible candidate is ﬁnancial literacy which seems to play an
outstanding role in the demand for private pension insurance. The probability of
having private pension insurance is about 10 percentage points higher in ﬁnancially
literate than in ﬁnancially illiterate households which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. This result is in line with the recent literature on the relationship between
ﬁnancial literacy, retirement planning ability and retirement saving (Lusardi and
Mitchell (2006, 2007a, 2007b) and van Rooij et al. (2007)) and is also supported
by Brown et al. (2008a) and Bucher-Koenen (2009).
Beneﬁt levels from the ﬁrst pillar proxied by the type of employment also have
substantial explanatory power. As expected, the marginal eﬀect of a self-employed
main earner who is least covered by the public pension system is largest. Thus, pre-
existing annuities tend to crowd out private pension insurance uptake which ought to
be the case according to Mitchell et al. (1999) and Dushi and Webb (2004) and
is empirically conﬁrmed by Bernheim (1991). According to our results, the predicted
probability also increases with being a worker or a civil servant. There, the marginal
eﬀect of being a civil servant exceeds that of being a worker. At ﬁrst glance, this seems
counterintuitive due to the relatively more generous beneﬁt levels for civil servants.
An explanation might be a more cautious and provident attitude of civil servants on
average that is not covered by other regressors.
Rather surprisingly, the monetary variables of (equivalent) net wealth, balance in
other insurance-type old-age provision and household income do not signiﬁcantly deter-
mine insurance demand. Wealthy households run a lower risk of depleting their assets
before death so that total wealth is theoretically supposed to negatively impact the
probability of opting for supplementary private pension insurance. However, in accor-
dance with Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b), Brown et al. (2008a) and Inkmann
et al. (2009), we do not ﬁnd this relationship in our data. In a similar manner, other
insurance-type old-age provision can be seen as a substitute to private pension insur-
ance such that a negative relationship is expected again. However, we again do not see
evidence of substitution between diﬀerent sources of old-age income. Instead, ahead
thinking households tend to rely on several sources of old-age income. This ﬁnding is
in line with other studies that also ﬁnd a positive relationship between participation
in alternative old-age provision and uptake of private pension plans (Börsch-Supan
et al. (2008b) and Inkmann et al. (2009))13. Finally, net (equivalent) household
income also does not seem to play a role in the uptake of private pension insurance.
13Note, however, that Inkmann et al. (2009) only ﬁnd this for a subsample of stockholders.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE DETERMINANTS 21
While Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) estimate a weakly signiﬁcant positive impact
of income on pension insurance uptake, our result corresponds to Brown et al.
(2008a)14.
As the average age of its members increases, a household’s probability to purchase
private pension insurance increases, but at a decreasing rate. Aggravating population
aging and raising awareness of decreasing replacement rates of the public pension sys-
tem should lead to a larger probability of supplementary pension insurance in young
households. The youngest households, however, possibly have not yet fully adressed
the matter of old-age provion which explains the observed nonlinearity. Whether the
respondent is married or lives in a partner household, does not seem to inﬂuence the
insurance decision. Thus, we do not ﬁnd evidence for intra-household risk pooling the-
oretically suggested by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). In contrast to Brown and
Poterba (2000) who ﬁnd higher annuity demand among singles than couples, our
results correspond to Brown et al. (2008a).
Households in Eastern Germany are more likely to purchase private pension in-
surance than their Western German counterparts. This might be explained by lower
expected public pension replacement rates of the Eastern German population due to
less continuous employment biographies and lower average income subject to contribu-
tion payments (Krenz and Nagl (2009))15. Interestingly, if the number of children
increases by one, the probability of having private pension insurance falls by about
two percentage points. We interpret this statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect as evidence for
a bequest motive or expected intergenerational transfer from children to their par-
ents during retirement. As mentioned by Bernheim (1991), children’s altruism might
function as a “safety net” that makes pension insurance less needed. Our ﬁnding cor-
responds to the empirical results by Bernheim (1991). However, quite a number
of studies does not ﬁnd an empirical indication of bequest motives in old-age provi-
sion (Hurd (1987), Brown (2001), Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b), Brown et al.
(2008a) and Inkmann et al. (2009)).
14Presumably, household income is an important determinant of the amount of insurance purchased
because of higher purchasing power and higher standard of living that needs to be insured. In principal,
we could estimate a two-stage model with the amount as the dependent variable in the second stage.
Unfortunately, data on private pension insurance premium in force and contributions to the scheme
prove to be unreliable such that we restrict our attention to the binary variable PPI.
15For a detailed income decomposition of the German elderly in the Old and New Laender see
Bönke et al. (forthcoming).5 CONCLUSION 22
5 Conclusion
We investigate determinants of private pension insurance uptake of German households
using the 2005 SAVE survey on savings and old-age provision. In a comprehensive
assessment of the relevant factors suggested by theory and previous empirical work,
we simultaneously estimate their importance in a multivariate framework. Our main
ﬁnding is that households take advantage of private information on expected lifetime
in the pension insurance choice. Conditional on other relevant variables, households
expecting to become old, are relatively more likely to take up supplementary private
pension insurance. This indicates the presence of adverse selection in the German
annuities market.
We also ﬁnd ﬁnancial literacy and pre-existing annuities to play a prominent role
in the insurance decision. Financially literate households, identiﬁed by their active
participation in the stock market, are signiﬁcantly more likely to hold private pension
insurance policies. Pre-existing annuities from the quantitatively most important pub-
lic pension system, tend to crowd out private insurance. Civil servants who beneﬁt from
relatively high public pension replacement rates, are less likely to have supplementary
private insurance than households with a self-employed main earner who are typically
not covered by the public system. In addition, the number of children is negatively
related to the probability of private pension insurance. This can be interpreted as an
indication of bequest motives or expected intergenerational altruism. According to our
results, uptake of private pension insurance does not diﬀer between single and partner
households.
In addition, we only ﬁnd very limited evidence for the theoretically suggested im-
portance of risk aversion and time preference. Our measure of risk aversion has no
explanatory power in the pension insurance choice. This might be explained by the
fact that a pension policy cannot only be seen as insurance, but also as a type of in-
vestment. On the one hand, the insurance character of private pensions that protects
the insurant from longevity risk should be appreciated by risk averse households. On
the other hand, the relatively uncertain return on a pension policy that depends on the
ex ante unknown length of life tends to retain risk averse households from purchase.
These two opposing eﬀects might therefore explain the lacking explanatory power of
our measure of risk aversion. Time preference has the expected negative coeﬃcient,
but it becomes insigniﬁcant as control variables are taken into account.
This work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuities markets.
Our result is in line with a number of related studies primarily focusing on the UK
and US that also ﬁnd evidence for adverse selection in annuities markets. While most
of these studies make use of the money’s worth concept to detect adverse selection, we
use micro level data and approach the issue from the perspective of the insurant. To
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to investigate adverse selection in the German annuities5 CONCLUSION 23
market at the household level. From the policy point of view, our work suggests that
the private pension insurance market is in fact characterized by ineﬃciencies related
to adverse selection. Diﬃculties arise for low risk individuals for whom insurance in
the private pension market is prohibitively expensive. Policy makers should therefore
keep in mind that privately insuring longevity risk is not without diﬃculty for part of
the population.
For future research, it would be meaningful to conduct a comparable analysis using
panel data that allows to observe household characteristics directly at the time of
annuity purchase. Since our indicators of risk and time preferences are rather rough,
we additionally consider it worthwhile to construct more sophisticated measures of
preferences in surveys. This would provide deeper insight in preference-driven selection
in insurance markets. Finally, it would be interesting to follow the development of the
German pension system and address to adverse selection in Riester pension plans.
While cautiously demanded in the beginning, holding of these increased to about 13
million contracts in end of 2009. Possibly, the design of the subsidy scheme that
strongly incentivizes speciﬁc parts of the population to take up Riester plans, outruns
the importance of life expectancy for proﬁtability of the policies and thus reduces
adverse selection.REFERENCES 24
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A Appendix
Derived Variable Original Variables
PRV f72m_4_imp
AVSLE f06s_imp; f10s_imp; f90o1_imp; f90o2_imp; f91o1_imp;
f91o2_imp; f91s_imp; f92o1_imp; f92o2_imp; f92s_imp
RISKAV f59a4_imp; f59a5_imp; f59a6_imp
TIMEPREF f59c1_imp; f59c2_imp; f59c3_imp
FINLIT f73eo6_imp; f73eo11_imp
CIVSERV f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
WORKER f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
SELFEMPL f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
NETWEALTHEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f68o_imp; f70o_imp; f73eo1_imp;
f73eo2_imp; f73eo3_imp; f73eo5_imp; f73eo6_imp;
f73eo11_imp; f78o1_imp; f78o2_imp; f78o3_imp;
f78o4_imp; f78o5_imp; f82o_imp; f84o_imp
OTHINSEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f73eo9_imp; f73eo10_imp
AVAGE f07o_imp; f10s_imp; f11o_imp; year




NETINCEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
EAST bula
Table 5: Derived variables and their underlying original variablesA APPENDIX 30














































Table 6: Fraction of imputed observations per underlying variable in estimation sampleA APPENDIX 31
Dataset
1 2 3 4 5
Reduced model Number of iterations: 3
LR chi2(3) 12.89 12.98 12.7 13.65 13.01
Prob > chi2 0.0049 0.0047 0.0053 0.0034 0.0046
Pseudo R2 0.0113 0.0113 0.0111 0.0119 0.0114
Log likelihood -565.2214 -565.1770 -565.3164 -564.8397 -565.1577
Full model Number of iterations: 4
(1)
LR chi2(15) 108.60 105.78 106.15 107.08 106.49
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0950 0.0925 0.0928 0.0937 0.0931
Log likelihood -517.3654 -518.7747 -518.5897 -518.1235 -518.4185
(2)
LR chi2(15) 106.91 103.98 104.14 105.09 104.56
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0935 0.0909 0.0911 0.0919 0.0915
Log likelihood -518.209 -519.677 -519.593 -519.117 -519.385
(3)
LR chi2(15) 108.71 105.93 106.26 107.33 106.59
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0951 0.0926 0.0929 0.0939 0.0932
Log likelihood -517.309 -518.701 -518.536 -517.999 -518.37
(4)
LR chi2(15) 107.06 104.15 104.28 105.38 104.68
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0936 0.0911 0.0912 0.0922 0.0916
Log likelihood -518.135 -519.589 -519.526 -518.973 -519.324
(5)
LR chi2(15) 108.11 105.26 105.59 106.48 105.96
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0946 0.0921 0.0924 0.0931 0.0927
Log likelihood -517.608 -519.033 -518.868 -518.426 -518.682
Table 7: Model summaries of probit estimations of the reduced and the ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of the full model for the ﬁve imputed datasetsA APPENDIX 32
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